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Expert-Captured Democracies
American Economic Review ( IF 10.7 ) Pub Date : 2020-06-01 , DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181396
Archishman Chakraborty 1 , Parikshit Ghosh 2 , Jaideep Roy 3
Affiliation  

Does public cheap talk by a biased expert benefit voters? The answer depends on the nature of democratic institutions and the extent of communication possibilities. Expert endorsements induce office-seeking parties to serve the expert's interests, hurting voters. Expert advocacy makes policies respond to information, helping voters. Together, policy advocacy and partisan endorsements are often better than either alone. Their interaction creates a delegation benefit that makes indirect democracy superior to direct democracy and office-seeking parties better than those motivated by public interest. But voter welfare is highest when an expert captured technocratic party competes against an uninformed populist one.

中文翻译:

专家控制的民主国家

有偏见的专家进行的公开廉价谈话是否会使选民受益?答案取决于民主制度的性质和交流的可能性。专家背书会促使寻求办公室的政党为专家的利益服务,从而伤害选民。专家倡导使政策响应信息,从而帮助选民。总之,政策倡导和党派支持往往比单独一个要好。他们之间的互动产生了代表团利益,使间接民主优于直接民主和寻求政党的政党,胜于那些出于公共利益动机的政党。但是,当一个被俘的技术专家专政党与一个不知情的民粹主义政党竞争时,选民的福利最高。
更新日期:2020-06-01
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