In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997–2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals.

中文翻译：

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公共部门组织的赞助和Selection选

在所有现代官僚机构中，政客在公共就业决策中保留一定的酌处权，如果政治联系代替个人能力，这可能会导致选拔过程中的摩擦。依靠1997-2014年间巴西公共雇员范围内详细的匹配的雇主-雇员数据，以及在紧密选举中的回归不连续性设计，我们得出了三个主要发现。首先，对于官僚和一线提供者而言，政治联系是公共组织中就业的关键且数量上很大的决定因素。其次，光顾是这一结果背后的重要机制。第三，政治上的考虑导致选择能力较弱的个人。