This article concerns the changing conditions of fiscal sovereignty within the Eurozone in the context of the evolution of the EU’s institutional crisis-management framework during the recent financial crisis. It begins with a method-of-difference approach to compare the dynamics and outcomes of the crisis in the Greek and Hungarian economies, on the basis of their similarly troubled fiscal positions and domestic political environments. On this basis, an argument is made that the outcomes in Greece (i.e. a breakdown in national fiscal sovereignty and severe economic losses) were not an inevitable product of the economic fundamentals, but at least partially attributable to uncertainty about the extent and expedience of financial assistance through the Eurozone’s crises management institutions. The European Central Bank’s (ECB) 2012 declaration of “unlimited support” for Eurozone governments has done much to calm markets, but has also created an institution with an ambiguous and self-imposed “dual-mandate”. This article concludes that the precedent established by the last crisis has created a fraught situation, leaving the Eurozone without viable options that are both economically efficacious and politically legitimate. Relying on either the ECB or the European Stability Mechanism to manage any future crisis could well provoke a backlash among the Eurozone member states as national fiscal sovereignty is eclipsed by ever-deeper ad hoc financial commitments on the part of the institutions of crisis management.

中文翻译：

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欧盟危机管理下的财政主权：希腊和匈牙利的比较

本文关注的是在最近的金融危机期间，随着欧盟机构危机管理框架的演变，欧元区财政主权条件的变化。首先从差异化方法开始，以希腊和匈牙利经济同样陷入困境的财政状况和国内政治环境为基础，比较危机的动态和结果。在此基础上，有人认为希腊的结果（即国家财政主权的崩溃和严重的经济损失）不是经济基本面的必然产物，而是至少部分归因于金融范围和权宜程度的不确定性。通过欧元区危机管理机构提供的援助。欧洲中央银行（ECB）在2012年宣布的对欧元区政府的“无限支持”做出了很大的努力，以平息市场，但同时也创建了一个具有模棱两可和自我强加的“双重授权”的机构。本文的结论是，上一次危机建立的先例造成了令人担忧的局面，使欧元区没有在经济上有效且在政治上合法的可行选择。依靠欧洲央行或欧洲稳定机制来管理未来的任何危机都可能在欧元区成员国之间引起强烈反响，因为危机管理机构对债务的更深入的临时性财政承诺使国家的财政主权黯然失色。但同时也创建了一个具有模棱两可和自我强加的“双重授权”的机构。本文的结论是，上一次危机建立的先例造成了令人担忧的局面，使欧元区没有在经济上有效且在政治上合法的可行选择。依靠欧洲央行或欧洲稳定机制来管理未来的任何危机都可能在欧元区成员国之间引起强烈反响，因为危机管理机构对债务的更深入的临时性财政承诺使国家的财政主权黯然失色。但同时也创建了一个具有模棱两可和自我强加的“双重授权”的机构。本文的结论是，上一次危机建立的先例造成了令人担忧的局面，使欧元区没有在经济上有效且在政治上合法的可行选择。依靠欧洲央行或欧洲稳定机制来管理未来的任何危机都可能在欧元区成员国之间引起强烈反响，因为危机管理机构对债务的更深入的临时性财政承诺使国家的财政主权黯然失色。