The Shapley–Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval both in the input and the output. The corresponding games are called (j, k) simple games. Here we present a new axiomatization for the Shapley–Shubik index for (j, k) simple games as well as for a continuous variant, which may be considered as the limit case.

中文翻译：

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在输入和输出中具有多个批准级别的游戏的Shapley–Shubik力量指数的公理化

Shapley–Shubik指数是Shapley值的专门化指标，广泛用于评估制定二元决策的委员会中的权力分配。它被推广到在输入和输出中具有两个以上批准级别的决策。相应的游戏称为（j，  k）简单游戏。在这里，我们为（j，  k）简单游戏以及连续变体的Shapley–Shubik指数提出了一种新的公理化方法，可以将其视为极限情况。