We characterize the optimal selling mechanism when bidders have ownership links among them (crossholdings). This mechanism discriminates against bidders who enjoy a value comparative advantage resulting from the extent to which they appropriate their own surplus. It is shown that since crossholdings improve the seller’s ability to selectively extract surplus from bidders, expected seller revenue is increasing with the asymmetry in these stakes. The optimal mechanism is implemented by a hybrid procedure that combines an auction with price preferences and a possible exclusive deal. An alternative negotiation procedure replicates some properties of the optimal one, and revenue-dominates most commonly used auction formats.

当投标人之间拥有所有权链接（交叉持股）时，我们将描述最佳销售机制。这种机制将投标人区别于那些由于其自身盈余的程度而享有价值比较优势的投标人。结果表明，交叉持股提高了卖方有选择地从投标人中提取盈余的能力，因此，随着这些股权的不对称，预期的卖方收入正在增加。最佳机制是通过将拍卖与价格偏好和可能的排他性交易相结合的混合程序来实现的。另一种协商程序可以复制最佳属性的某些属性，而收入则是最常用的拍卖格式。