John Rawls’s thesis that a certain package of basic liberties should be given lexical priority is of great interest for legal and political philosophy, but it has received relatively little defense from Rawls or his supporters. In this paper, I examine three arguments for the thesis: the first is based on the two ‘moral powers’; the second, on the social bases of self-respect; and the third, on a Kantian notion of autonomy. I argue none of these accounts successfully establishes 1) the distinct claim of lexical priority, 2) for the complete package of basic liberties (including the fair value of the political liberties), on the basis of reasons that are appropriately public. In turn, I propose an alternative argument, in support of those two claims, based on the social or ‘relational’ conception of equality.

中文翻译：

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自由的优先权：来自社会平等的论证

约翰·罗尔斯 (John Rawls) 的论点应该给予一定的基本自由组合词汇优先权，这对法律和政治哲学来说很重要，但罗尔斯或他的支持者对它的辩护相对较少。在这篇论文中，我检查了论文的三个论点：第一个是基于两种“道德力量”；第二，基于自尊的社会基础；第三，关于康德的自主性概念。我认为这些叙述都没有成功地建立 1) 词汇优先权的独特主张，2) 基于适当公开的理由，完整的基本自由包（包括政治自由的公允价值）。反过来，我提出了一个替代论点，以支持这两个主张，基于平等的社会或“关系”概念。