This paper examines the impact of different risk attitudes on the financial decisions of two insiders trading in the stock market. We consider a static version of the Kyle (Econometrica 53:1315–1335, 1985) model with two insiders. Insider 1 is risk neutral while insider 2 is risk averse with negative exponential utility. First, we analytically prove the existence of a unique linear equilibrium. Second, we carry out a comparative static analysis with respect to the duopoly case of risk-neutral insiders (Tighe in Three essays on insider trading. Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, 1989) and with respect to the duopoly case of risk-averse insiders (Holden and Subrahmanyam in Econ Lett 44:181–190, 1994) models. Our findings reveal that the market depth and the information revelation are higher in Tighe (1989) than in our model. However, compared to Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994), we find that the market depth depends crucially on the degree of risk aversion. Finally, we show that regardless of the degree of risk aversion, the stock price reveals more information in our model than the stock price in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994).

中文翻译：

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不同风险态度的内幕交易

本文考察了不同风险态度对两个股票市场内幕交易者财务决策的影响。我们考虑具有两个内部人员的 Kyle (Econometrica 53:1315–1335, 1985) 模型的静态版本。内部人 1 是风险中性的，而内部人 2 是具有负指数效用的风险厌恶者。首先，我们分析证明了唯一线性平衡的存在。其次，我们对风险中性内幕人士的双头垄断案例（Tighe 在关于内幕交易的三篇文章。未发表的博士论文，伊利诺伊大学香槟分校，1989 年）进行了比较静态分析，并针对规避风险内部人士的双头垄断案例（Holden 和 Subrahmanyam 在 Econ Lett 44:181–190, 1994）模型。我们的研究结果表明，Tighe (1989) 的市场深度和信息揭示高于我们的模型。然而，与 Holden 和 Subrahmanyam (1994) 相比，我们发现市场深度关键取决于风险厌恶程度。最后，我们表明，无论风险厌恶程度如何，与 Holden 和 Subrahmanyam (1994) 中的股票价格相比，我们模型中的股票价格揭示了更多信息。