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National political pressure groups and the stability of international environmental agreements
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics ( IF 2.404 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-03 , DOI: 10.1007/s10784-020-09520-5
Achim Hagen , Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera , Hans-Peter Weikard

This paper examines the effects of political pressure groups (lobbies) on transboundary emissions of individual countries and on the stability of international environmental agreements to reduce emissions. We consider two types of lobbies, industry and environmentalists, and we allow for asymmetric countries to consider differences in lobby strengths to study strategic international spillovers of national lobby activities. In our model, lobby groups in countries that are non-signatories to the agreement will impact abatement of the lobby’s home country only. In contrast, lobby activities in signatory countries have spillover effects on the abatement decisions of other member countries. As lobby strength impacts abatement, it will, in turn, impact the incentives to participate in the agreement. We find that lobby activities from both lobby groups, industry and environmentalists, can have the potential to facilitate international cooperation to abate global pollution. This, however, depends on the distribution of lobby activities across countries and on whether green lobby groups have a national or international focus.

中文翻译:

国家政治压力集团与国际环境协定的稳定性

本文考察了政治压力团体(游说团体)对个别国家跨界排放的影响以及对减少排放的国际环境协定的稳定性的影响。我们考虑了两种类型的游说团体,工业游说者和环保主义者,我们允许不对称国家考虑游说力量的差异,以研究国家游说活动的战略性国际溢出效应。在我们的模型中,未签署协议的国家的游说团体只会影响游说母国的减排。相比之下,签约国的游说活动对其他成员国的减排决定具有溢出效应。由于游说力量影响减排,它将反过来影响参与协议的动机。我们发现两个游说团体的游说活动,工业界和环保主义者,可以有潜力促进国际合作以减轻全球污染。然而,这取决于游说活动在各国的分布以及绿色游说团体是否具有国家或国际重点。
更新日期:2020-12-03
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