We extend prior research on corporate governance and non-audit services (NAS) by distinguishing between the management entrenchment region of management ownership and regions in which the interests of management and shareholders converge. Management entrenchment and convergence-of-interests regions were estimated for our sample of 5198 Australian firm-years. NAS is negatively (positively) associated with management ownership in the convergence-of-interests (entrenchment) regions. However, using a sub-sample based on firms that have audit committees, we find the association between NAS and management ownership is confined to the entrenchment region, while audit committee strength is negatively associated with NAS fees across all management ownership regions.

JEL Classification: M42, M48

通过区分管理层所有权的管理根深蒂固区域和管理层与股东利益趋同的区域，我们扩展了对公司治理和非审计服务（NAS）的先前研究。我们在5198个澳大利亚公司年的样本中估计了管理层的纠缠和利益趋同区域。NAS与利益趋同（根深蒂固）区域中的管理所有权负相关（正）相关。但是，使用基于具有审计委员会的公司的子样本，我们发现NAS与管理层所有权之间的联系仅限于固守区域，而审计委员会的实力则与所有管理层所有地区的NAS费用负相关。

JEL分类：M42，M48