The multilateral adoption of the automatic exchange of information (AEI) on bank accounts held by nonresidents was a breakthrough in the fight against cross-border tax evasion, which led to a substantial reduction in the value of bank deposits and investment portfolios in traditional tax havens. However, there is suspicion that sophisticated tax evaders engage in regulatory arbitrage of AEI provisions. We examine whether two widely discussed secrecy schemes, namely golden visas and anonymous trusts and shell corporations, have been used to circumvent information reporting. Relying on a difference-in-difference design, we only find scattered evidence for use of the secrecy schemes. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory arbitrage is not yet widespread, but it seems to increase over time. We thus provide evidence for the current effectiveness of the AEI but also show that closing remaining loopholes is of utmost importance. We link our findings to debates about the (im)possibility of re-embedding neoliberal globalization.

中文翻译：

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监管套利的受害者？自动交换信息和使用黄金签证和公司壳

非居民银行账户自动信息交换（AEI）的多边采用是打击跨境逃税的一个突破，导致传统避税天堂的银行存款和投资组合价值大幅下降. 然而，有人怀疑老练的逃税者参与了对 AEI 条款的监管套利。我们研究了两个广泛讨论的保密计划，即黄金签证和匿名信托和空壳公司，是否已被用于规避信息报告。依靠差异设计，我们只能找到使用保密方案的零散证据。总体而言，我们的结果表明监管套利尚未普遍存在，但似乎随着时间的推移而增加。因此，我们为 AEI 当前的有效性提供了证据，但也表明关闭剩余的漏洞至关重要。我们将我们的发现与关于重新嵌入新自由主义全球化的（不可能）可能性的辩论联系起来。