We consider a vertical market comprising of a manufacturer engaging in advertising and two retailers offering differentiated products. We analyze the endogenous order of moves for the retailers and demonstrate that they may choose a more competitive environment: simultaneous pricing under Bertrand competition or sequential producing under Cournot competition. This result is robust even if we extended our model to third‐degree wholesale price discrimination and persuasive advertising.

中文翻译：

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内在时间和制造商广告：注意事项

我们考虑一个垂直市场，该市场由从事广告的制造商和提供差异化​​产品的两个零售商组成。我们分析了零售商的内在移动顺序，并证明他们可能选择更具竞争性的环境：在Bertrand竞争下同时定价或在Cournot竞争下顺序生产。即使我们将模型扩展到三级批发价格歧视和有说服力的广告，此结果也很可靠。