当前位置:
X-MOL 学术
›
Journal of Public Economic Theory
›
论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Interregional negotiations and strategic delegation under government subsidy schemes
Journal of Public Economic Theory ( IF 1.336 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-15 , DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12494 Ryusuke Shinohara 1
Journal of Public Economic Theory ( IF 1.336 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-15 , DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12494 Ryusuke Shinohara 1
Affiliation
We examine the strategic delegation problem in the context of interregional negotiations under the subsidy policies of a central government. It is well known that when such negotiations are delegated to representatives, each region in a country elects its representative strategically, resulting in inefficient negotiation outcomes. This study focuses on a common subsidy policy called a cost‐matching grant to examine whether an optimal grant exists that restores the efficiency of negotiation outcomes. Our results show that the central government obtains this optimal grant if the manipulability of the negotiation breakdown outcome is sufficiently weak. The strength of the manipulability is important because introducing a grant generates a new kind of manipulation of negotiation breakdown outcomes. However, when a new representative is elected after a negotiation breaks down, the new manipulability is negated. Hence, the central government always obtains the optimal cost‐matching grant.
中文翻译:
政府补贴计划下的区域间谈判和战略授权
我们在中央政府的补贴政策下,在区域间谈判的背景下研究战略授权问题。众所周知,将这种谈判委派给代表进行谈判时,一个国家的每个地区都会从战略上选举其代表,从而导致谈判结果效率低下。这项研究着重于一项共同的补贴政策,称为成本匹配补助金检查是否存在可以恢复谈判结果效率的最佳拨款。我们的结果表明,如果谈判破裂结果的可操纵性足够弱,中央政府将获得这一最佳拨款。可操作性的强度很重要,因为引入赠款会产生一种新的操纵谈判破裂结果的方法。但是,当谈判破裂后选出新的代表时,新的可操作性就被否定了。因此,中央政府总是获得最优的成本匹配拨款。
更新日期:2020-12-15
中文翻译:
政府补贴计划下的区域间谈判和战略授权
我们在中央政府的补贴政策下,在区域间谈判的背景下研究战略授权问题。众所周知,将这种谈判委派给代表进行谈判时,一个国家的每个地区都会从战略上选举其代表,从而导致谈判结果效率低下。这项研究着重于一项共同的补贴政策,称为成本匹配补助金检查是否存在可以恢复谈判结果效率的最佳拨款。我们的结果表明,如果谈判破裂结果的可操纵性足够弱,中央政府将获得这一最佳拨款。可操作性的强度很重要,因为引入赠款会产生一种新的操纵谈判破裂结果的方法。但是,当谈判破裂后选出新的代表时,新的可操作性就被否定了。因此,中央政府总是获得最优的成本匹配拨款。