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Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints
Journal of Public Economic Theory ( IF 1.336 ) Pub Date : 2020-10-16 , DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12482
Battal Doğan 1 , Serhat Doğan 2 , Kemal Yıldız 2
Affiliation  

In several matching markets, to achieve diversity, agents' priorities are allowed to vary across an institution's available seats, and the institution is let to choose agents in a lexicographic fashion based on a predetermined ordering of the seats, called a (capacity‐constrained) lexicographic choice rule. We provide a characterization of lexicographic choice rules and a characterization of deferred acceptance mechanisms that operate based on a lexicographic choice structure under variable capacity constraints. We discuss some implications for the Boston school choice system and show that our analysis can be helpful in applications to select among plausible choice rules.

中文翻译:

可变容量约束下的词典选择

在几个匹配的市场中,为了实现多样性,允许代理商的优先级在机构的可用席位之间变化,并且让机构根据词典的预定顺序(称为(容量受限),以词典编排的方式选择代理商。词典选择规则。我们提供了词典选择规则的表征,以及在可变容量约束下基于词典选择结构运行的递延接受机制的表征。我们讨论了对波士顿学校选择系统的一些影响,并表明我们的分析可以帮助您在合理的选择规则中进行选择。
更新日期:2020-10-16
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