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Public Thrift, Private Perks: Signaling Board Independence with Executive Pay
Journal of Finance ( IF 7.915 ) Pub Date : 2020-11-12 , DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12989
PABLO RUIZ‐VERDÚ , RAVI SINGH

We analyze how boards' reputational concerns influence executive compensation and the use of hidden pay. Independent boards reduce disclosed pay to signal their independence, but are more likely than manager‐friendly boards to use hidden pay or to distort incentive contracts. Stronger reputational pressures lead to lower disclosed pay, weaker managerial incentives, and higher hidden pay, whereas greater transparency of executive compensation has the opposite effects. Although reputational concerns can induce boards to choose compensation contracts more favorable to shareholders, we show that there is a threshold beyond which stronger reputational concerns harm shareholders. Similarly, excessive pay transparency can harm shareholders.

中文翻译:

公共节俭,私人津贴:发信号通知董事会独立性与高管薪酬

我们分析董事会的声誉问题如何影响高管薪酬和隐性薪酬的使用。独立董事会会减少披露的薪酬以表明其独立性,但比对经理友好的董事会更有可能使用隐性薪酬或扭曲激励合同。较高的声誉压力导致较低的披露薪酬,较弱的管理激励措施和较高的隐性薪酬,而较高的高管薪酬透明度则有相反的效果。尽管声誉问题可能会促使董事会选择更有利于股东的薪酬合同,但我们表明,存在一个更高的门槛,越强的声誉问题就会损害股东利益。同样,过高的薪酬透明度也可能损害股东利益。
更新日期:2020-11-12
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