We develop a unified theory of dynamic contracting and assortative matching to explain firm dynamics. In our model, neither firms nor managers can commit to arrangements that yield lower payoffs than their outside options, which are microfounded by the equilibrium conditions in a matching market. The model endogenously generates power laws in firm size and CEO compensation, and explains differences in their right tails. We also show that our model quantitatively accounts for many salient features of the time‐series dynamics and the cross‐sectional distribution of firm investment, dividend payout, and CEO compensation.

中文翻译：

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有限承诺和分类匹配的企业动力学统一模型

我们开发了动态合同和分类匹配的统一理论来解释公司动态。在我们的模型中，公司和管理者都不能承诺产生比其外部期权要低的收益的安排，外部期权是由匹配市场中的均衡条件所微观建立的。该模型内生于公司规模和首席执行官薪酬方面的权力定律，并解释其右尾角的差异。我们还表明，我们的模型从数量上解释了时间序列动力学的许多显着特征，以及公司投资，股息支付和首席执行官薪酬的横截面分布。