We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We elicit conditions under which an essentially unique D1 equilibrium bidding function exists in the second‐price and the English auctions. We establish there is no equivalence between these two auction designs, neither in bidding strategies nor in expected revenue. This is because the presence or the absence of an increasing price clock affects signaling incentives differently in both auction formats, and thereby also the bidders' incentives to overbid their types. This leads to a strictly higher expected revenue in the second‐price auction than in the English auction. Our analysis is completed by a comparison with other disclosure policies. Applications include art auctions and charity auctions.

中文翻译：

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带有信号问题的拍卖

我们研究带有信号的对称私募拍卖，其中拍卖结果由外部观察者用来推断投标人的类型。我们得出了在第二价格拍卖和英国拍卖中存在本质上唯一的D1均衡竞价函数的条件。我们确定这两种拍卖设计在出价策略和预期收入上都没有对等。这是因为在两种拍卖形式中，存在或不存在价格时钟不断上涨，都会对信号激励产生不同的影响，从而也影响了投标人对其类型的出价过高的激励。因此，与英国拍卖相比，第二价格拍卖的预期收入要严格更高。我们的分析是通过与其他披露政策进行比较而完成的。