This paper attempts to challenge two puzzles in the welfare program. The first puzzle is “non-take-up welfare,” which occurs when needy people do not take up welfare. Second, in some countries, the benefit level is high, but the recipient ratio is low; while the other nations have lower benefit levels but higher recipient ratios. We present a model of welfare stigma in which both non-take-up and welfare fraud exist within the equilibrium. This shows the possibility for the recipient ratio to decrease as the benefit level increases in the comparative statics. Our empirical results are consistent with our theoretical results.

中文翻译：

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福利欺诈和不接受的耻辱模型：来自经合组织面板数据的理论和证据

本文试图挑战福利计划中的两个难题。第一个难题是“不领取福利”，当有需要的人不领取福利时，就会出现这种情况。第二，在一些国家，福利水平高，但受助率低；而其他国家的福利水平较低，但受助人比例较高。我们提出了一个福利耻辱模型，其中不接受和福利欺诈都存在于均衡中。这表明在比较统计数据中，随着福利水平的提高，受助人比率可能会降低。我们的实证结果与我们的理论结果一致。