We examine the relationship among inheritance taxes, shareholder protection, and the family firms' market value. Drawing on the family firm, corporate governance, and institutional complementarities literature, we argue that inheritance taxes act as external corporate governance mechanisms for decoupling business families' socioemotional goals. However, this depends upon minority investor protections. In strong protection countries, the incentives for family self-governance created by high inheritance taxes are offset by the loss of business family autonomy inherent in strong shareholder protection. Using a sample of 284 firms across 31 countries, we provide support for these arguments. Results suggest that inheritance and shareholder protection laws are substitutive external corporate governance mechanisms to align business family and nonfamily shareholders' interests.

中文翻译：

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继承税、股东保护和家族企业的市场价值：跨国分析

我们考察了遗产税、股东保护和家族企业市场价值之间的关系。借鉴家族企业、公司治理和制度互补性文献，我们认为遗产税作为外部公司治理机制，使企业家族的社会情感目标脱钩。然而，这取决于少数投资者的保护。在强有力的保护国家，高遗产税所产生的家族自治激励被强有力的股东保护所固有的家族企业自主权的丧失所抵消。我们使用 31 个国家/地区的 284 家公司作为样本，为这些论点提供支持。