Abstract

This paper studies periods of prolonged contractions in output per capita in a sample of 145 countries from 1950 to 2014. Economic slumps are defined as abrupt interruptions of a period of growth by several regime switches. Slumps start with a sharp contraction along with a trend break, which is followed by another switch when growth stabilizes again. The paper then analyzes the correlates of these slumps, focusing on the length and depth of the contraction, from the beginning of the slump to its trough. The results establish three new stylized facts: (i) weak political institutions predate crises whereas political reforms tend to follow them, (ii) the length and depth of economic declines are robustly correlated with executive constraints and ethnic heterogeneity, and (iii) there is a robust interaction between these two variables, suggesting that institutions constraining leaders are important for stabilizing growth. This is particularly relevant for Sub-Saharan Africa, where politics are often ethnic and decision makers are comparatively unconstrained.

中文翻译：

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弱机构会延长危机吗？经济衰退期间衰退的识别，特征和持续时间

摘要

本文研究了1950年至2014年间145个国家的样本中人均产出长期收缩的时期。经济衰退被定义为通过几次政权转换突然中断了一个增长时期。暴跌始于急剧的收缩以及趋势的突破，随后当增长再次趋于稳定时又发生了另一次转变。然后，论文分析了这些坍落度的相关性，重点是从坍落度开始到低谷的收缩的长度和深度。结果建立了三个新的程式化事实：（i）较弱的政治制度早于危机，而政治改革往往紧随其后；（ii）经济衰退的时间和深度与行政约束和种族异质性密切相关，（iii）存在这两个变量之间的强大互动，这表明限制领导人的制度对于稳定增长很重要。这对于撒哈拉以南非洲尤其重要，因为撒哈拉以南非洲的政治往往是种族，决策者相对不受限制。