Abstract

We develop a dynamic model of a criminal case, from arrest through plea bargaining and (possibly) trial, allowing for the potential discovery of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors (who choose whether to disclose it) and defendants. We consider three regimes: (1) no disclosure required; (2) disclosure only required before trial; and (3) early disclosure required from arrest onward. These regimes have complex distributional consequences for the defendants. We find that innocent defendants ex ante prefer early disclosure whereas guilty defendants prefer disclosure only before trial. We also explore some of the social costs attributable to the regimes (JEL K4, D82, D73).

中文翻译：

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减少不公正的定罪：辩诉交易，审判和证据披露

摘要

我们开发了一个动态的刑事案件模型，从逮捕到辩诉交易和（可能）审判，可以让检察官（选择是否披露）和被告有可能发现有罪有罪的证据。我们考虑三种制度：（1）无需披露；（2）仅在审判前要求披露；（3）要求从逮捕开始就及早披露。这些制度对被告具有复杂的分配后果。我们发现事前无辜的被告更倾向于早期披露，而有罪的被告则更倾向于仅在审判前进行披露。我们还将探讨可归因于这些政权的一些社会成本（JEL K4，D82，D73）。