Abstract

Many economists have analyzed the efficiency of a volunteered army relative to a conscripted army. However, they have rarely studied the working of real-world alternative, market-based, military institutions where exemptions from military service are traded among the citizens. This paper fills this gap by studying the rise and fall of the Remplacement Militaire in the eighteenth and the nineteenth century France. This system endured for more than three quarters of a century until the French government progressively moved toward universal conscription after 1872. At times of military expansion, the State regulated the replacement market. We argue that the goal of such regulations was to limit the increase in fraud and avoid a deterioration in the quality of the soldiery associated with increases in the price of replacements.

中文翻译：

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填补空缺：革命后法国的重新安置军人

摘要

许多经济学家分析了志愿军相对于应征入伍的军队的效率。但是，他们很少研究现实世界中以市场为基础的替代性军事机构的运作方式，在这些机构中，公民之间可以交换免役服务。本文通过研究18世纪和19世纪法国更换军事组织的兴衰来填补这一空白。这种制度持续了四分之三以上的世纪，直到1872年之后法国政府逐渐转向普遍征兵制。在军事扩张时期，国家对替代市场进行了管制。我们认为，此类法规的目的是限制欺诈的增加，并避免与补给价格上涨相关的士兵素质的下降。