Abstract

Mark Pernecky and Paul Wojick use T.S. Kuhn’s philosophy of science to diagnose The problematic nature and consequences of the effort to force Keynes into the conceptual cul-de-sac of Walrasian economics. But their diagnosis is itself problematical in nature and consequence. It assumes the virtues of a pre-Kuhnian philosophy of knowledge that the Kuhnian meta-framework overtly discards. One way to eliminate the inconsistency is to recognise that Kuhn’s philosophy of science and sociology of knowledge function to immunise theories from criticism. Anyone who wishes to embrace a sociologically more critical philosophy ought to consider instead the philosophical attitude of critical rationalism.

中文翻译：

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凯恩斯，库恩和知识社会学：评佩尔内奇和沃吉克

摘要

马克·佩尔内基（Mark Pernecky）和保罗·沃克（Paul Wojick）使用TS库恩（TS Kuhn）的科学哲学来诊断迫使凯恩斯进入瓦尔拉斯经济学的概念中心的问题性质和后果。但是，他们的诊断本身在本质和后果上都是有问题的。它假定了库恩元框架公开丢弃的库恩前知识哲学的优点。消除矛盾的一种方法是认识到库恩的科学哲学和知识社会学的作用是使理论免于批评。任何希望接受社会学上更为批判的哲学的人都应该改为考虑批判理性主义的哲学态度。