The article offers a new perspective on the interaction of international investment law with other fields of international law based on an empirical study of the use of conflict clauses in over 1,000 investment treaties, providing a first systematic account of this type of provision. The use and content of conflict clauses serve as an indicator of state priorities regarding the coordination of investment standards of protection with other disciplines in the international law matrix. Both numerically and from qualitative perspectives, the clauses’ survey reveals important asymmetries in the engagement on the part of investment treaty makers with international economic disciplines, as compared to non-economic disciplines and human rights more specifically. Indeed, conflict clauses on international economic law are much more common, more detailed and establish clearer priority rules than similar provisions on any other field of international law; and the disparity is only likely to deepen over time. This analysis suggests that negotiators already have the toolkit to create effective links between international norms and institutions, and it is only its use that is uneven. As a result, the article suggests a shift in policy perspective to reflect that reality. Such a shift seems all the more relevant considering the growing body of literature showing that investment arbitrators (and international adjudicators more generally) pay only limited attention to norms from fields beyond their own, thus casting doubt on their capacity to develop a principled approach on the issue without treaty guidance.

中文翻译：

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非经济学科仍处于次要地位：投资条约中冲突条款的故事

本文基于对 1,000 多个投资条约中冲突条款使用的实证研究，为国际投资法与其他国际法领域的相互作用提供了一个新的视角，提供了对此类条款的第一个系统说明。冲突条款的使用和内容可作为国家优先事项的指标，以协调投资保护标准与国际法矩阵中的其他学科。无论从数量上还是从定性角度来看，这些条款的调查都揭示了与非经济学科和更具体的人权相比，国际经济学科的投资条约制定者在参与方面存在重要的不对称性。事实上，国际经济法的冲突条款更为普遍，比任何其他国际法领域的类似规定更详细和建立更明确的优先规则；而且这种差距只会随着时间的推移而加深。这一分析表明，谈判者已经拥有在国际规范和机构之间建立有效联系的工具包，只是它的使用不均衡。因此，本文建议改变政策观点以反映这一现实。考虑到越来越多的文献表明投资仲裁员（以及更普遍的国际仲裁员）对来自其所在领域以外的规范的关注有限，因此这种转变似乎更加相关，因此对他们制定原则性方法的能力产生了怀疑。没有条约指导的问题。