In collective pension arrangements without a sponsor guarantee, assets and liabilities are commingled, and members' benefits are adjusted to reflect emerging plan experience. Stakeholders pay attention to the fairness of the intergenerational transactions arising from the inclusion of certain design elements; however, implicit intergenerational transactions exist even in pure collective defined contribution (CDC) arrangements without any such explicit stabilization mechanisms. In this study, we find that the implicit risk transactions are uneven: significant value transfers among cohorts can result from joining a pure CDC plan. We then compare these to the additional value transfers arising from explicit stabilization mechanisms.

在没有赞助人担保的集体退休金安排中，资产和负债混合在一起，并且调整成员的福利以反映新出现的计划经验。利益相关者注意由于包含某些设计元素而产生的代际交易的公平性；然而，即使在没有任何这种明确的稳定机制的纯集体界定供款（CDC）安排中，也存在隐含的代际交易。在这项研究中，我们发现隐性风险交易是不均衡的：加入纯粹的CDC计划可导致同类之间的重大价值转移。然后，我们将这些与显式稳定机制产生的额外价值转移进行比较。