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Institutional Debtholder Governance
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ( IF 4.337 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-04 , DOI: 10.1017/s0022109020000630
Aneel Keswani , Anh Tran , Paolo Volpin

Using data on the universe of U.S. based mutual funds, we find that two out of five fund families hold corporate bonds of firms in which they also own an equity stake. We show that the greater the fraction of debt a fund family holds in a given firm, the greater its propensity to vote in line with the interests of firm debtholders at shareholder meetings, even when against Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendation. Voting has direct policy consequences as firms that receive more votes in favor of creditors make corporate decisions more in line with the interests of debtholders.

中文翻译:

机构债务人治理

使用美国共同基金的数据,我们发现五分之二的基金家族持有他们也拥有股权的公司的公司债券。我们表明,基金家族在给定公司中持有的债务比例越大,其在股东大会上根据公司债务持有人的利益进行投票的倾向就越大,即使在反对机构股东服务 (ISS) 建议的情况下也是如此。投票具有直接的政策后果,因为获得更多支持债权人选票的公司做出的公司决策更符合债权人的利益。
更新日期:2020-08-04
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