This paper examines the perceptual and reasoning processes that underpin regularities in behaviour. A distinction is made between situations as they are, or as described by an omniscient external observer, and situations as agents see or frame them. Different frames can stem from differences in culture, experience and personality, as well as from other context-specific factors. Drawing upon David Lewis’s Convention (1969), I show that consistency between reasoning and experience does not preclude individuals from understanding the same state of affairs differently, and that agents’ beliefs about others’ beliefs may well be wrong. As a result, cases may occur in which conventions are sustained by false but mutually consistent and self-confirming beliefs.

中文翻译：

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框架、推理和约定的出现

本文研究了支撑行为规律性的感知和推理过程。将情境本身或无所不知的外部观察者所描述的情境与代理人所看到或框定的情境加以区分。不同的框架可能源于文化、经验和个性的差异，也可能源于其他特定环境的因素。借鉴大卫刘易斯的习俗(1969)，我表明推理和经验之间的一致性并不妨碍个人以不同的方式理解相同的事态，而且代理人对他人信仰的信仰很可能是错误的。因此，可能会出现这样的情况，即约定由错误但相互一致和自我确认的信念来维持。