ABSTRACT

In the 1970’s, a controversy arose about a probability problem posed by Irving Copi. One side argued that a common spontaneous intuition about the problem is correct; the other side argued that this intuition is mistaken. Here, I argue (1) that the naïve intuition yields the correct answer, but accidentally and for a wrong reason; (2) that a more reflective intuition yields a wrong answer, and hence, is also mistaken; and (3) that an even more reflective intuition yields the correct answer for a correct reason. This warrants what I call optimistic fallibilism concerning intuitions about probability: although intuition is certainly prone to error in this domain, intuition has the capacity for self-correction. A naïve intuition that is mistaken can be replaced by a distinct, reflective intuition; and a reflective intuition that is mistaken can be replaced by another reflective intuition – with the process ultimately yielding a sound intuition.

抽象的

在1970年代，关于欧文·科皮（Irving Copi）提出的概率问题引起了争议。一方认为，关于该问题的共同自发直觉是正确的；反之亦然。另一方则认为这种直觉是错误的。在这里，我认为（1）天真的直觉会给出正确的答案，但是是出于偶然和错误的原因；（2）更具反思性的直觉会产生错误的答案，因此也是错误的；（3）更具反思性的直觉会出于正确的原因而产生正确的答案。这证明了我所谓的关于概率直觉的乐观谬论：尽管直觉在这个领域肯定容易出错，但是直觉具有自我纠正的能力。可以将天真的错误直觉替换为独特的，反思性的直觉。