Abstract: Cross‐border regulatory arbitrage by global banks remains the main challenge to the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. This article aims to improve the understanding of the extent to which macroprudential initiatives around the world have shaped global banking, focusing on U.S. banks. An ad hoc dataset on the geographical distribution of on and off balance sheet activities of foreign branches allows the investigation of whether regulatory arbitrage has stimulated international leakages of macroprudential regulation. I first focus my attention on the lending behavior in those host countries in which foreign branches are left out of the regulatory perimeter via the institution‐targeted tools implementation. I then investigate whether macroprudential policy leakages due to regulatory arbitrage occur via off‐balance sheet activities. My findings suggest that institution‐targeted macroprudential regulation in host countries increases branches’ local lending, especially when U.S. banks are also exempted from the corresponding tool at home. I further find evidence in support of the fact that stricter local macroprudential policy has increased off‐balance sheet activities of resident foreign branches, as far as interest rate swaps exposures are concerned. From a normative standpoint, my results highlight the importance of reciprocity and international cooperation among macroprudential regulators

中文翻译：

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全球银行业和宏观审慎政策：美国银行的新证据

摘要：全球银行的跨境监管套利仍然是宏观审慎政策有效性的主要挑战。本文旨在提高对全球宏观审慎举措对全球银行业的影响程度的理解，重点关注美国银行。一个关于外国分支机构表内和表外活动地理分布的临时数据集可以调查监管套利是否刺激了宏观审慎监管的国际泄漏。我首先将注意力集中在那些外国分支机构通过以机构为目标的工具实施被排除在监管范围之外的东道国的贷款行为上。然后我研究了由于监管套利导致的宏观审慎政策泄漏是否通过表外活动发生。我的研究结果表明，东道国针对机构的宏观审慎监管增加了分支机构的本地贷款，特别是当美国银行在国内也免于使用相应工具时。我进一步发现证据支持更严格的地方宏观审慎政策增加了常驻外国分支机构的表外活动，就利率掉期风险敞口而言。从规范的角度来看，我的研究结果强调了宏观审慎监管者之间互惠和国际合作的重要性 我进一步发现证据支持更严格的地方宏观审慎政策增加了常驻外国分支机构的表外活动，就利率掉期风险敞口而言。从规范的角度来看，我的研究结果强调了宏观审慎监管者之间互惠和国际合作的重要性 我进一步发现证据支持更严格的地方宏观审慎政策增加了常驻外国分支机构的表外活动，就利率掉期风险敞口而言。从规范的角度来看，我的研究结果强调了宏观审慎监管者之间互惠和国际合作的重要性