ABSTRACT

In this paper, we evaluate the private incentive to cooperate comparing three different scenarios (R&D cooperation, and R&D competition with and without licensing), in terms of expected profits, industry probability of innovation, and expected welfare. We show that the feasibility of licensing increases the appropriability of returns and may stimulate R&D investment; moreover, licensing an innovation may lead to the highest social welfare. However, some conflict may emerge between the public and private incentive to license the innovation, and between different policy targets.

中文翻译：

---

与许可合作和投资的研发激励措施

摘要

在本文中，我们从预期利润、行业创新概率和预期福利方面评估了比较三种不同情景（研发合作、研发竞争与许可）的私人合作激励。我们表明，许可的可行性增加了回报的可分配性，并可能刺激研发投资；此外，许可一项创新可能会带来最高的社会福利。然而，在公共和私人对创新许可的激励之间以及不同的政策目标之间可能会出现一些冲突。