ABSTRACT

Net profits of state-run chance games are either earmarked for non-defence ‘good causes’ or added to the public purse in international practice. The Turkish case is unique as 95% of profits were earmarked for the extrabudgetary Defence Industry Support Fund (DISF) by legislation during 1986–2007. The DISF administers security equipment procurement and domestic arms production in Turkey. The earmarking practice was dissolved in 2007 and chance game profits are transferred to the general budget. The incomings of the DISF are from the budget and from earmarked taxes from 2007 onwards. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of these practices on chance game sales for the period 1986–2017. Noting that a chance game is a joint public-private good, participation is motivated by expectations for private gain but at the same time loss is legitimised by expectations for provision of public services with the takeout part. In order to gain insight into the societal motives in chance game participation in Turkey our model is defined in the context of private (consumerism) cum public (security, warfare) interest. The VECM estimates support a long-run relationship between chance game sales and security variables.

摘要

国营机会游戏的净利润要么指定用于非国防的“公益事业”，要么在国际实践中加入公共钱包。土耳其的案例是独一无二的，因为 1986-2007 年期间通过立法将 95% 的利润指定用于预算外国防工业支持基金 (DISF)。DISF 负责管理土耳其的安全设备采购和国内武器生产。指定用途的做法在 2007 年解散，机会游戏的利润转入一般预算。DISF 的收入来自预算和 2007 年以后的专项税收。本文的目的是调查这些做法对 1986-2017 年期间随机游戏销售的影响。注意到机会博弈是一种公私合营的商品，参与是出于对私人收益的期望，但同时损失是由对提供公共服务的期望与外卖部分的期望合法化的。为了深入了解土耳其参与机会游戏的社会动机，我们的模型是在私人（消费主义）和公共（安全、战争）利益的背景下定义的。VECM 估计支持机会游戏销售和安全变量之间的长期关系。