ABSTRACT

This study finds differential performance impacts of outsider and insider interim CEO successions. Stock markets react incrementally positively to interim CEO successions when the interim CEOs are from outside rather than inside firms. Relative to insider interim CEOs, outsider interim CEOs produce worse earnings performance and greater restructuring charges during their services but lead more frequently to outsider permanent CEO appointments followed by better long-term earnings performance. Our findings suggest that market reactions to interim CEO successions rationally impound the investors’ expectation that outsider relative to insider interim CEO successions will generate greater short-term disruption but pave the way for greater long-term performance improvement.

摘要

本研究发现了外部和内部临时 CEO 继任对绩效的不同影响。当临时 CEO 来自外部而不是内部公司时，股票市场对临时 CEO 继任的反应越来越积极。相对于内部临时 CEO，外部临时 CEO 在其任职期间产生更差的盈利表现和更高的重组费用，但更频繁地导致外部长期 CEO 任命，然后是更好的长期盈利表现。我们的研究结果表明，市场对临时 CEO 继任的反应合理地抑制了投资者的预期，即相对于内部的临时 CEO 继任，局外人将产生更大的短期干扰，但为更大的长期业绩改善铺平道路。