In this article, we investigate the pricing and quality decisions of mobile applications (apps) by the platform owner and third-party app developer. The third-party app developer shares some fraction of revenue with the platform owner. We investigate the impact of revenue sharing fraction on quality enhancement and pricing decisions. One would expect that, as the revenue sharing fraction earned by the platform increases, the platform's effort toward enhancing the quality of her app should increase. However, our analysis reveals that when the third-party app developer's cost structure is high (/low), and the difference between initial app quality valuation of the platform's app and developer's app is high (/low), then the platform decreases the quality improvement efforts. Similarly, we also find that if the developer's revenue-sharing fraction increases, he may also decrease the quality efforts. Later, we also analyze the scenario where a platform can influence the competing developer's app quality. We find that if the platform's effort only influences the competing third-party developer's app quality, then the platform reduces the rival's app quality. Finally, in our analysis, we find that if the platform's effort toward the rival's app also enhances her app's quality, she may increase the rival's app quality.

中文翻译：

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竞争下移动应用的质量与定价决策

在本文中，我们调查了平台所有者和第三方应用程序开发人员对移动应用程序（应用程序）的定价和质量决策。第三方应用开​​发商与平台所有者分享部分收入。我们调查了收益分成比例对质量提升和定价决策的影响。可以预期，随着平台获得的收益分成比例增加，平台提高其应用程序质量的努力应该会增加。然而，我们的分析表明，当第三方应用开​​发者的成本结构高（/低），且平台应用和开发者应用的初始应用质量估值之间的差异高（/低）时，平台会降低质量。改进努力。同样，我们也发现如果开发者' 收入分享比例增加，他也可能减少质量努力。稍后，我们还会分析平台可以影响竞争开发者的应用质量的场景。我们发现，如果平台的努力只影响竞争对手的第三方开发者的应用程序质量，那么平台会降低竞争对手的应用程序质量。最后，在我们的分析中，我们发现如果平台对竞争对手应用程序的努力也提高了她的应用程序质量，她可能会提高竞争对手的应用程序质量。那么平台会降低竞争对手的应用质量。最后，在我们的分析中，我们发现如果平台对竞争对手应用程序的努力也提高了她的应用程序质量，她可能会提高竞争对手的应用程序质量。那么平台会降低竞争对手的应用质量。最后，在我们的分析中，我们发现如果平台对竞争对手应用程序的努力也提高了她的应用程序质量，她可能会提高竞争对手的应用程序质量。