Of the different types of government outlays, since the 2000s public investment has been the main variable of adjustment during recessions in advanced and emerging economies. These contractions (expansions) have been associated with relatively medium-high (low) sovereign spreads, especially in advanced economies. To rationalize these issues, we develop a model of fiscal policy and sovereign default, with corporate default risk. Policymakers must decide between the provision of an unproductive public good and public investment, weighting their respective net benefits in terms of short-term stabilization and debt sustainability. In our model, investment follows a countercyclical stance only in the case of low levels of debt and moderate negative shocks, and otherwise contracts during recessions. The policy stance, along with the mix between different outlays, is determined by how sovereign risk responds to adverse economic shocks.

自2000年代以来，在不同类型的政府支出中，公共投资一直是发达经济体和新兴经济体衰退期间调整的主要变量。这些收缩（扩张）与相对较高（较低）的主权利差相关，尤其是在发达经济体中。为了合理化这些问题，我们建立了带有公司违约风险的财政政策和主权违约模型。政策制定者必须在提供非生产性公共物品和公共投资之间做出决定，并在短期稳定和债务可持续性方面权衡各自的净收益。在我们的模型中，仅在债务水平低且负面冲击适度的情况下，投资才遵循反周期立场，否则在衰退期间收缩。政策立场，