Abstract Coups and regime transitions are events that typically are intended to change the basic institutional framework of a country. Which specific institutions change and the consequences of these changes nevertheless remains largely unknown. Change after a coup or transition implies that some form of political or judiciary barrier has been erected or removed. We therefore focus on what happens to the quality of judicial institutions and political corruption around coup attempts and other types of regime transitions. We hypothesize that when coups are conducted by members of the incumbent political elite, they are likely to remove barriers to change while coup makers outside of the ruling elite are more likely to do the opposite and thus protect themselves from what remains of the elite in the political system. Using the new Bjornskov-Rode coup dataset, our results suggest that successful coups are associated with degradation of institutions, with successful military coups in particular having a significant negative effect. Results are more varied for civilian coups where we find indications of differences depending on whether the coup makers are part of a political elite or not. We also explore whether the incumbent regime influences the effect of coup attempts on institutional change.

中文翻译：

---

政变、政权更迭和制度后果

摘要 政变和政权更迭是通常旨在改变一个国家的基本制度框架的事件。然而，哪些具体机构发生了变化以及这些变化的后果在很大程度上仍然未知。政变或过渡后的变化意味着某种形式的政治或司法障碍已经建立或消除。因此，我们关注围绕政变企图和其他类型的政权更迭，司法机构的质量和政治腐败会发生什么变化。我们假设，当现任政治精英成员发动政变时，他们可能会消除变革的障碍，而统治精英之外的政变制造者更有可能做相反的事情，从而保护自己免受政治精英残余的影响。政治体系。使用新的 Bjornskov-Rode 政变数据集，我们的结果表明成功的政变与制度的退化有关，特别是成功的军事政变具有显着的负面影响。平民政变的结果更加多样化，我们发现不同的迹象取决于政变制造者是否属于政治精英。我们还探讨了现任政权是否会影响政变企图对制度变迁的影响。