Electoral reforms that lead to reduced turnout modify the composition of the electorate, potentially overrepresenting specific interests in policy implementation. Intergenerational redistribution tilts in favor of the elderly when they are sufficiently numerous, but in favor of the young rich otherwise. We exploit a natural experiment provided by the repeal of compulsory voting in Austrian parliamentary elections to study how exogenous turnout decline affects intergenerational redistribution through pro-young public education spending in Austrian municipalities. Empirically, education spending falls when the proportion of elderly voters exceeds 21% of the electorate, but rises when the proportion of elderly voters is below this threshold.

中文翻译：

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选民投票率和代际再分配

导致投票率降低的选举改革改变了选民的构成，可能会在政策实施中过度代表特定利益。当老年人数量足够多时，代际再分配有利于老年人，否则有利于年轻的富人。我们利用奥地利议会选举中废除强制投票所提供的自然实验来研究外生投票率下降如何通过奥地利城市的亲青年公共教育支出影响代际再分配。从经验上看，当老年选民的比例超过选民的 21% 时，教育支出会下降，但当老年选民的比例低于这一阈值时，教育支出会上升。