In a large-scale field experiment, I study the impact of intermediate suggested donations, and the absence of them, on charitable giving. In line with a compromise effect, transforming $100 from the highest suggested donation to the intermediate suggested donation tripled the likelihood to donate $100, and increased the average donation. However, it was the introduction of a higher maximum suggestion—not the change in the intermediate suggestion per se—that was decisive: Faced with only the two extreme suggested donations, people turned to the write in category to select an individual compromise donation. I refer to this finding as the (un)compromise effect, because it highlights that people gravitate towards compromise alternatives also in the explicit absence of them. A follow-up experiment confirms that time pressure moderates the (un)compromise effect, which suggests that the underlying mechanism is cognitive rather than an instinctive response to avoid extreme alternatives. Overall, the study adds to our understanding of why people prefer intermediate options in general, and how suggested donations shape public good contributions in particular.

在一个大规模的现场实验中，我研究了中间建议的捐赠以及捐赠的缺失对慈善捐赠的影响。与折衷效应一致，将100美元从建议的最高捐款转变为中等的建议捐款，使100美元捐款的可能性增加了三倍，并增加了平均捐款额。但是，这是引入了更高的最大建议，而不是中间建议本身的变化-这是决定性的：面对仅有的两个建议的极端捐赠，人们转向“分类”类别来选择个人折衷捐赠。我将这一发现称为“（妥协）妥协效应”，因为它突显了人们在明确缺乏替代方案的情况下也倾向于采用替代方案。一项后续实验证实，时间压力会减轻（不）妥协的影响，这表明潜在的机制是认知的，而不是本能的反应，以避免极端的选择。总的来说，这项研究使我们对人们为什么普遍偏爱中间选择以及建议的捐赠如何特别影响公共利益做出了理解。