We investigate the extent to which loan officers generate independent, individual effects on the design and performance of syndicated loans. We construct a large database containing the identities of loan officers involved in structuring syndicated loan deals, allowing us to systematically disentangle borrower, bank, and loan officer fixed effects. We find that loan officers have significant influence on interest spreads, loan covenant design, and loan performance. Inclusion of borrower fixed effects increases our power to rule out the alternative that loan officer fixed effects reflect the matching of officerds to borrowers based on time-invariant borrower characteristics. We document heterogeneity in loan officers’ influence across loan contract terms, with loan officers exerting stronger influence over covenant package design than over interest spreads, but marginal influence on loan maturity. Lead officers have greater influence than participant officers over covenant package design and loan performance, but less robust differential influence on interest spreads.

我们调查了信贷员在多大程度上对银团贷款的设计和绩效产生了独立的影响。我们构建了一个大型数据库，其中包含参与组织银团贷款交易的贷款官员的身份，从而使我们能够系统地区分借款人，银行和贷款官员的固定影响。我们发现，信贷员对息差，贷款契约设计和贷款绩效具有重大影响。将借款人固定效应包括在内，可以增强我们排除借款人固定效应反映基于借款人随时间变化的特征而使职员与借款人匹配的选择的能力。我们记录了贷款专员在整个贷款合同条款中影响力的异质性，贷款人员对契约包设计的影响要大于对息差的影响，但对贷款期限的影响很小。牵头官员在合同套餐设计和贷款绩效方面的影响要比参与者官员更大，但对利差的稳健差异影响较小。