When shareholders of a target firm expect a value improving takeover to be successful, they are individually better off not tendering their shares to the buyer and the takeover potentially fails. Squeeze-out procedures can overcome this free-riding dilemma by allowing a buyer to enforce a payout of minority shareholders and seize complete control of the target firm. However, it is often argued that shareholder litigation restores the free-riding dilemma. Applying a sequential takeover game, we examine the two standard legal remedies of shareholders, the ‘action of avoidance’ and the judicial ‘price fairness review’ and demonstrate that it is not shareholder litigation that brings back the free-riding dilemma, but rather the strategic gambling of buyers for lower prices and flaws in the design and application of squeeze-out laws. We also analyze a favorable change in jurisdiction of the German Federal Court and provide implications for legal policy.

当目标公司的股东期望增值收购能够成功时，他们个人最好不要将其股份出售给买方，并且收购可能会失败。挤出程序可以通过允许买方强制执行对少数股东的支付并夺取对目标公司的完全控制权来克服这种搭便车的困境。但是，经常有人争辩说，股东诉讼恢复了搭便车的困境。运用顺序接管博弈，我们研究了股东的两种标准法律补救措施：“回避行为”和司法“价格公平审查”，并证明，不是股东诉讼带回了搭便车的困境，而是买方进行战略性赌博，以降低价格，并制定和实施挤压法律。