The protracted political dispute between South Korea and Japan over the wartime brothels called "comfort stations" obscures the contractual dynamics involved. These dynamics reflected the straightforward logic of the "credible commitments" so basic to elementary game theory. The brothel owners and potential prostitutes faced a problem: the brothel needed credibly to commit to a contractual structure (i) generous enough to offset the dangers and reputational damage to the prostitute that the job entailed, while (ii) giving the prostitute an incentive to exert effort while working at a harsh job in an unobservable environment.

Realizing that the brothel owners had an incentive to exaggerate their future earnings, the women demanded a large portion of their pay upfront. Realizing that they were headed to the war zone, they demanded a relatively short maximum term. And realizing that the women had an incentive to shirk, the brothel owners demanded a contractual structure that gave women incentives to work hard. To satisfy these superficially contradictory demands, the women and brothels concluded indenture contracts that coupled (i) a large advance with one- or two-year maximum terms, with (ii) an ability for the women to leave early if they generated sufficient revenue.

日韩之间关于战时妓院的旷日持久的政治争端被称为“慰安所”，掩盖了所涉及的合同动力。这些动态反映了基本博弈论基础的“可信承诺”的直接逻辑。妓院的所有者和潜在的妓女面临一个问题：妓院需要切实地履行合同结构（i）足够慷慨以抵消工作所带来的对妓女的危险和声誉损害，同时（ii）给予妓女激励在无法观察的环境中在艰苦的工作中努力工作。

妇女意识到妓院的主人有动机夸大其未来的收入，因此，妇女要求他们的大部分预付款。意识到他们即将前往战区，他们要求相对较短的最长任期。妓院老板意识到妇女有逃避的动机，因此要求建立契约结构，以激励妇女努力工作。为了满足这些表面上矛盾的要求，妇女和妓院签订了契约合同，该契约与（i）一笔大的预付款以及最长为一或两年的期限，以及（ii）妇女能够产生足够的收入而提早离开的能力。