This study examines the impact of staggered boards, poison pills and unequal voting rights on corporate innovation intensity using a sample of listed firms in six Asian countries from 2010 to 2017. We analyze the differential effects of antitakeover provisions using the high order fixed effects panel data model that controls for firm fixed effects, industry-year fixed effects and country-year fixed effects. The propensity score matching is used to deal with possible endogeneity issues. This paper provides evidence that staggered boards impede R&D investments. In contrast we show that unequal voting rights and poison pill provisions have no significant effect on long term R&D investments. We also find that a combination of a staggered board and a poison pill provision discourages innovation investments. This study uncovers an economic mechanism on the differential effects of antitakeover provisions on R&D responsiveness to firm investment sets. Staggered boards decrease the sensitivity of R&D to the investment opportunity set, resulting to higher innovative inefficiency. The managerial moral hazard effect of staggered boards disproportionately contributes to low firm performance in innovative firms. This study provides evidence on the source of the efficiency loss from staggered boards by pointing to its governance role in promoting more inefficient allocation of R&D capital.

这项研究使用2010年至2017年亚洲六个国家的上市公司样本，研究了交错的董事会，毒药和不平等的投票权对公司创新强度的影响。我们使用高阶固定影响面板数据分析了反收购规定的不同影响控制企业固定效应，行业年度固定效应和国家年度固定效应的模型。倾向得分匹配用于处理可能的内生性问题。本文提供的证据表明，交错的董事会阻碍了研发投资。相反，我们表明，不平等的投票权和毒丸条款对长期的R＆D投资没有重大影响。我们还发现，错开的木板和毒药的组合会阻碍创新投资。这项研究揭示了一种反收购条款对研发对企业投资组合的反应性产生不同影响的经济机制。错开的板降低了研发对投资机会的敏感性，从而导致更高的创新效率。交错董事会的管理道德风险效应不成比例地导致了创新型企业的低绩效。这项研究通过指出董事会在促进研发资本的低效分配中的治理作用，为交错董事会效率损失的根源提供了证据。交错董事会的管理道德风险效应不成比例地导致了创新型企业的低绩效。这项研究通过指出董事会在促进研发资本的低效分配中的治理作用，为交错董事会效率损失的根源提供了证据。交错董事会的管理道德风险效应不成比例地导致了创新型企业的低绩效。这项研究通过指出董事会在促进研发资本的低效分配中的治理作用，为交错董事会效率损失的根源提供了证据。