We compare an $n$-firm Cournot model with a Stackelberg model, where $n$-firms choose outputs sequentially, in a stochastic demand environment with private information. The expected total output, consumer surplus, and total surplus are lower, while expected price and total profits are higher in the Stackelberg perfect revealing equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium. These rankings are the opposite of the rankings of prices, total output, surplus, and profits under perfect information. We also show that the first $n-1$ firms’ expected profits form a decreasing sequence from the first to the $(n-1){}^{st}$ in the Stackelberg game. The last mover earns more expected profit than the first mover if $n\le 4,$ or the ratio of the signals’ informativeness to the prior certainty is sufficiently low. Lastly, there is a discontinuity between the Stackelberg equilibrium of the perfect information game and the limit of Stackelberg perfect revealing equilibria, as the noise of the demand information of firms vanishes to zero at the same rate. We provide various robustness checks for the results when the precision of signals are asymmetric, there is public information or cost/quality uncertainty, or the products are differentiated.

我们比较 $ñ$-带有库克尔伯格模型的古诺模型，其中 $ñ$-企业在具有私人信息的随机需求环境中，依次选择输出。与库尔诺均衡相比，斯塔克尔贝格完美揭示均衡中的预期总产出，消费者剩余和总盈余更低，而预期价格和总利润更高。这些排名与完美信息下的价格，总产出，剩余和利润的排名相反。我们还表明，第一个$ñ-\mathrm{1个}$ 企业的预期利润从第一个到最后一个递减顺序 $（ñ-\mathrm{1个}）{}^{sŤ}$在Stackelberg游戏中。如果符合以下条件，则最后一位搬家者比第一位搬家者获得更多预期利润$ñ\le 4，$或者信号的信息量与先验确定性的比率足够低。最后，由于企业需求信息的噪声以相同的速度消失为零，因此在完美信息博弈的斯塔克尔伯格均衡与斯塔克尔伯格完美展示均衡的极限之间存在不连续性。当信号的精度不对称，存在公共信息或成本/质量不确定性或产品有所差异时，我们为结果提供各种鲁棒性检查。