We analyze a standard pivotal-voter model under majority rule, with two rival groups of players, each preferring one of two public policies and simultaneously deciding whether to cast a costly vote, as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). We allow the benefit of the favorite public policy to differ across groups and impose an intuitive refinement, namely that voting probabilities are continuous in the cost of voting to pin down a unique equilibrium. The unique cost-continuous equilibrium depends on a key threshold that compares the sizes of the two groups.

中文翻译：

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具有不对称群体规模和不对称利益的完整信息枢轴投票人模型

我们分析了在多数制下的标准的关键投票者模型，该模型有两个相互竞争的参与者群体，每个群体都偏好两种公共政策中的一种，同时决定是否进行昂贵的投票，如Palfrey和Rosenthal（1983）所示。我们允许偏爱的公共政策的利益在各个群体之间有所不同，并进行直观的改进，即投票概率在投票成本中是连续不断的，以限定唯一的平衡。独特的成本连续均衡取决于比较两个组的大小的关键阈值。