Utilizing the natural experiment presented by India's Companies Act of 2013, this paper investigates the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement and earnings management. India's Act includes provisions designed to improve governance and financial audits, as well as a unique mandate requiring firms that satisfy size or profitability criteria to spend a minimum of 2% of reported income on CSR initiatives. We examine the earnings management behavior of firms that voluntarily reported CSR expenditures prior to the Act's implementation as well as those firms that began to report CSR spending as a consequence of the mandate. Results indicate that firms which voluntarily reported CSR expenditures before the Act also engaged in more earnings management than other firms, consistent with CSR being used manipulatively in the pre-Act period. Once the Act was in effect, evidence indicates that on average firms engaged in less earnings management. However, the results suggest the CSR mandate did not have a significant marginal impact on earnings manipulations, implying that the observed decrease in earnings management in the post-Act period was primarily due to other provisions of the Act, such as those related to corporate governance.

利用印度《 2013年公司法》提出的自然实验，研究了企业社会责任（CSR）参与度与盈余管理之间的关系。印度法令包括旨在改善治理和财务审计的规定，以及一项独特的命令，要求满足规模或获利标准的公司将至少2％的报告收入用于CSR计划。我们研究了在该法案实施之前自愿报告CSR支出的公司以及由于任务授权而开始报告CSR支出的公司的盈余管理行为。结果表明，在该法案颁布之前自愿报告企业社会责任支出的公司比其他公司从事更多的收益管理，与在《法案》生效前对CSR进行操纵相吻合。该法案生效后，有证据表明，平均而言，公司从事的收益管理较少。但是，结果表明，企业社会责任的授权对收益操纵没有重大的边际影响，这意味着在《法令》颁布后所观察到的收益管理下降主要是由于该法令的其他规定，例如与公司治理有关的规定。