The common view that insurer buyer power may effectively counteract provider market power critically rests on the idea that consumers and insurers have a joint interest in pushing for price and cost reductions. We develop theory and provide experimental evidence that the interests of insurers and consumers may be misaligned when insurers have the power to influence the service supplier’s cost. Insurers with such buyer power may benefit from increasing initial loss sizes to create demand for insurance. Insurer competition eliminates their profits but markets do not return to the initial non‐insurance state. This constitutes a welfare loss.

中文翻译：

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（非）保险市场，损失规模操纵和竞争：实验证据*

保险人的购买力可以有效地抵消提供者的市场力的普遍观点是，消费者和保险人对降低价格和降低成本有着共同的兴趣。我们发展理论并提供实验证据，证明当保险公司有权影响服务提供商的成本时，保险公司和消费者的利益可能会错位。具有这种购买力的保险公司可能会从增加的初始损失额中受益，从而产生对保险的需求。保险公司的竞争消除了他们的利润，但市场没有回到最初的非保险状态。这构成了福利损失。