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Grants for Whom and Why? The Politics of Allocation of Transfers in Brazil
The Developing Economies ( IF 1.500 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-12 , DOI: 10.1111/deve.12265
Jorge L D. Ferreira 1 , Alexandre F. Alves 2 , Emilie Caldeira 3
Affiliation  

This study discusses political and electoral reasons for the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state. We tested the influence of political alignment with the federal government and deputies, and the effects of elections and changes in alliance status upon Brazilian discretionary transfers. We performed a panel data analysis encompassing 2,856 municipalities from 1999 to 2011. The results suggest that the federal government buys support in Congress by awarding grants to deputies. Moreover, the alignment between the municipal and federal chief executives is central to the allocation of grants, and a negative correlation exists when the mayor is affiliated with an opposition party and when an opposition deputy has a strong support base within the municipality. Furthermore, changes in alliance status between the budget‐voting and budget‐implementation stages influence the number of transfers. The federal government also increased the allocation of grants in years featuring municipal and federal elections, particularly the latter.

中文翻译:

为谁和为什么授予?巴西转移支付的政治

这项研究讨论了在联邦州分配政府间转移支付的政治和选举原因。我们测试了与联邦政府和人大代表政治结盟的影响,以及选举和联盟地位变化对巴西酌情转移的影响。从1999年到2011年,我们进行了覆盖2856个城市的面板数据分析。结果表明,联邦政府通过向议员提供赠款来获得国会的支持。此外,市政府和联邦行政首长之间的一致对补助金的分配至关重要,当市长隶属反对党时,而反对党代表在市政内部有强大的支持基础时,则存在负相关关系。此外,预算投票阶段和预算实施阶段之间联盟状态的变化会影响转移次数。联邦政府还增加了以市政和联邦选举为特色的年份的拨款分配,特别是后者。
更新日期:2021-02-12
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