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Does nepotism run in the family? CEO pay and pay-performance sensitivity in Indian family firms
Strategic Management Journal ( IF 7.815 ) Pub Date : 2020-12-21 , DOI: 10.1002/smj.3263
Guoli Chen 1 , Raveendra Chittoor 2 , Balagopal Vissa 1
Affiliation  

Using a principal–principal agency theory lens, we examine corporate governance and compensation design in family-owned businesses. We conceptualize how CEO pay and pay-performance sensitivity is influenced by whether the CEO is a professional or drawn from the controlling family (family CEO). Data from a sample of 277 publicly listed Indian family firms during 2004–2013 support our argument that family CEOs get paid more than professional CEOs. This pattern is stronger in superior-performing firms that are named after the controlling family (eponymous firms). Furthermore, family CEOs of superior-performing firms have higher pay-performance sensitivity compared to professional CEOs of other superior-performing firms. Our findings reveal nuanced heterogeneity in nepotism in emerging economy family firms—CEO compensation is a mechanism for some controlling families to tunnel corporate resources.

中文翻译:

家庭中是否存在裙带关系?印度家族企业的 CEO 薪酬和薪酬绩效敏感性

使用委托人代理理论的视角,我们研究了家族企业的公司治理和薪酬设计。我们概念化了 CEO 的薪酬和薪酬绩效敏感性如何受到 CEO 是专业人士还是来自控股家族(家族 CEO)的影响。2004-2013 年 277 家上市印度家族企业样本的数据支持我们的观点,即家族 CEO 的薪酬高于职业 CEO。这种模式在以控股家族命名的表现优异的公司(同名公司)中更为明显。此外,与其他业绩优异公司的职业 CEO 相比,业绩优异公司的家族 CEO 具有更高的薪酬绩效敏感性。
更新日期:2020-12-21
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