Grounding on the literature on resource dependence, board political capital, and principal–principal conflicts, I conceptualize governmental minority shareholding as a governance strategy through which ventures access information about future policy shifts and better calibrate their decisions before policy implementation. I test these arguments on multicountry firm-level longitudinal data about European venture capital (VC)-backed and comparable non-VC-backed companies. By means of a difference-in-differences methodology and exploiting the staggered announcement of tax reforms across countries, I show that public VC-backed companies after a tax reform announcement show higher productivity than non-VC-backed ventures, and this effect lasts 4 years. After decomposing productivity, the post-announcement effect of public VC backing is mainly due to both an output effect (sales value increase) and an enhanced efficiency in the labor factor.

中文翻译：

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政府对企业家的窃窃私语：公共风险投资、政策转变和企业生产力

基于有关资源依赖、董事会政治资本和委托人-委托人冲突的文献，我将政府少数股权概念化为一种治理策略，企业可以通过该策略获取有关未来政策变化的信息，并在政策实施之前更好地校准其决策。我在关于欧洲风险投资 (VC) 支持和可比较的非 VC 支持公司的多国公司层面纵向数据上测试了这些论点。通过差异中的差异方法并利用各国税收改革的交错宣布，我表明税收改革宣布后上市的风险投资支持的公司比非风险投资支持的企业表现出更高的生产力，并且这种影响持续 4年。分解生产力后，