This article adds the empirically verified, but analytically neglected, fact of delayed worker training to a model of general training. By delaying training, firms can gain partial information on worker‐firm matches, generating wage compression. Analytical results differ from those of other training models. In the noncooperative regime, all firm‐paid training is delayed, all worker‐paid training is immediate. With no externalities to other firms, the cooperative result is Pareto‐optimal. In a continuous‐time extension, firms choose a probationary period after which workers are trained. With longer probations, fewer bad‐match workers are trained and wage compression rises. Government training mandates are also studied.

中文翻译：

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延迟公司支付的一般培训

本文将经过经验验证但在分析上被忽略的延迟工人培训的事实添加到普通培训的模型中。通过延迟培训，企业可以获得关于工人与公司的匹配的部分信息，从而压缩工资。分析结果与其他训练模型不同。在非合作制中，所有公司支付的培训均被延迟，所有工人支付的培训均应立即进行。在没有其他公司外部性的情况下，合作结果是帕累托最优的。在连续时间扩展中，公司选择试用期，之后对员工进行培训。试用期越长，培训不匹配工人的人数就越少，工资压缩也随之增加。政府培训的任务也进行了研究。