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The welfare implications of transboundary storage and dam ownership on river water trade
Mathematical Social Sciences ( IF 0.6 ) Pub Date : 2020-10-24 , DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.10.005
Anand Abraham , Parthasarathy Ramachandran

River water trade is a method for reallocating water among riparian states in an efficient and self-enforcing fashion. In this study, we investigate the functioning of river water markets when the upstream state has the ability to build dams. Using a two-agent model, we describe the implications that dam ownership can have on agent welfare as well as on social welfare. We introduce and discuss the concept of strategic storage in river sharing problems, which refers to the withholding of water by the upstream state exclusively for the purpose of trade. We investigate the conditions under which an agent would resort to such a behaviour. We show that having such strategic storage creates a welfare loss for the downstream agent and also results in the loss of social welfare. As an empirical illustration, we study the allocation of the Cauvery river water to agricultural users and municipal users located upstream and downstream of the Krishnaraja Sagar (KRS) dam respectively.



中文翻译:

跨界存储和大坝所有权对河流水贸易的福利影响

河流水贸易是一种以有效和自我执行的方式在河岸国家之间重新分配水的方法。在这项研究中,我们研究了上游国家具备建造水坝的能力时河流水市场的功能。使用两主体模型,我们描述了水坝所有权对主体福利以及社会福利的影响。我们介绍并讨论战略存储的概念在河流共享问题中,指上游国家仅出于贸易目的而扣留水。我们调查了代理商采取这种行为的条件。我们表明,进行这种战略存储会给下游代理人造成福利损失,并导致社会福利的损失。作为经验例证,我们研究了Cauvery河水分配给分别位于Krishnaraja Sagar(KRS)大坝上游和下游的农业用户和市政用户的情况。

更新日期:2020-12-23
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