Abstract

A damages rule is called compensatory if it requires compensation of each party who complied with the due care standard for harm caused by deficient precaution of the other party. The two main contributions of this article are as follows. First, we show that any Nash equilibrium of the game induced by a compensatory damages rule enhances welfare compared to the welfare that would have been attained if both parties had complied. This is true irrespective of whether the due care standards are set at their socially optimal level. Second, we provide a general result for evaluating the conditions under which courts have sufficient information to implement compensatory damages rules. This is the case when the available evidence allows courts to determine whether the injurer’s precaution choice was the but-for cause of any harm to the victim. The exact levels of precaution and harm need not be observable (JEL K13).

中文翻译：

---

因果关系与补偿性赔偿金规则的可实施性

摘要

如果损害赔偿规则要求对因另一方的预防措施不足而引起的应有的适当护理标准的每一方进行赔偿，则该赔偿规则被称为补偿性规则。本文的两个主要贡献如下。首先，我们证明了与补偿性规则相比，由补偿性损害赔偿规则引起的博弈的纳什均衡都会提高福利。无论是否将适当护理标准设置在其社会最佳水平，这都是正确的。其次，我们提供了一个总体结果，用于评估法院在什么条件下有足够的信息来执行补偿性赔偿规则。当可用证据允许法院确定伤害者的预防措施是否是对受害者造成伤害的唯一原因时，就是这种情况。JEL K13）。